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INTRODUCTION
To the extent that Marveon, Inc., (hereinafter
"Marveon") has petitioned this Court to rehear the last two
paragraphs of its Opinion filed February 10, 1989, Young
Electric Sign Company (hereinafter "YESCO") agrees with and
supports Marveon's petition.

However, to the extent

Marveon argues that YESCO should pay damages to Marveon as
a result of the alleged breach of contract and that this Court
should assess those damages in an amount equivalent to what
Marveon's insurer paid on its behalf for its share of the
judgment, YESCO vigorously objects.

This Court should rehear

argument by counsel for both Marveon and YESCO on the
damage issue and it should determine that Marveon was not
damaged by YESCO1s breach of contract (if any) for failure to
provide insurance and is therefore not responsible to Marveon
for any amount of money whatsoever.

In the alternative, should

this Court determine that such a ruling must come from the
trial court, it should remand for a determination of damages
actually suffered by Marveon as a result of YESCOfs failure
to purchase an insurance policy with Marveon as a named
insured.

Damages should not be determined by some artificial

standard of what coverage would the insurance policies have
provided if actually purchased and how would payment have been

allocated between the policies depending upon the relevant,
comparable "other insurance" clauses.

Rather, damages should

be awarded on the basis of Marveon's actual damages incurred by
reason of YESCO's failure to purchase insurance.
YESCO asserts that no damages should be paid by it to
Marveon for three distinct, yet related, reasons. First,
Marveon's assets were purchased by YESCO prior to the
accident which precipitated this lawsuit, and subsequent to the
time Marveon purchased the insurance that ultimately covered
Marveon for the negligence allocated to it by the jury.
Marveon's liability resulted from its installation of a sign in
1978.

YESCO purchased the maintenance contract on that sign in

August of 1981. At the time the accident occurred, YESCO owned
virtually all of Marveon's equipment and employed most of its
employees.

For all intents and purposes, Marveon was YESCO, at

least with respect to this sign, at the time of the accident.
It is YESCO's position that Marveon's carrier is trying to
subrogate against its own insured, a position that is clearly
precluded by Utah law.
Second, Marveon suffered no damage as a result of
YESCO's failure to provide insurance for Marveon.

Marveon

purchased insurance three years prior to its asset sale to
YESCO.

After judgment, Marveon's carrier paid for

Marveon's share of the judgment which was essentially
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determined by multiplying its percentage of fault by the total
damages.

Marveon paid not one dime. Marveon!s carrier paid

only for Marveon1s assigned negligence.

A basic rule of

subrogation is that the subrogated party, in this case
Marveon1s insurance carrier, can only enforce those rights of
action that Marveon has against YESCO.

Because Marveon paid

for none of YESCOfs fault, Marveon has no recoverable claim
against YESCO founded on tort liability^
Finally, although Marveon may have a claim for breach
of contract against YESCO, it has no damages.

In any event,

Marveon1s carrier has no subrogated interest in a breach of
contract claim by Marveon against YESCO.

This is particularly

true in light of the fact that the policy of insurance which
paid Marveon's share of liability was purchased three years
prior to the asset sale of Marveon to YESCO.

Further, it is

Utah law that a subrogated interest must be the result of tort
liability unless otherwise specified.

ARGUMENT
Essentially, Marveon has argued in its Petition for
Rehearing that the measure of damages as a result of YESCO!s
failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon should be
the amount of money paid out on behalf of Marveon through its
insurance policy which was purchased prior to the sale of
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Marveon1s contracts and assets to YESCO.

As set out below/

this would be a completely improper result under the
circumstances of this case.

Nonetheless, it is absolutely

essential that this Court determine what the measure of damages
will be and apply that measure of damages to the facts at hand
or remand to the trial court for guidance.

YESCO agrees with

Marveon that the measure of damages as set out by the Court in
its Opinion handed down February 10f 1989, is inappropriate in
the circumstances; however, YESCO does not agree with Marveon
what the measure of damages, if any, should be.

It is critical

that the Court be allowed to step back from the case in order
to see the entire picture.

Counsel for Marveon urges a myopic

analysis which will result in unfair treatment of parties in
this case as well as to parties to cases in the future.

This

analysis will provide windfall recoveries for insurance
companies not in any way related to the contractual
arrangements between the parties to the action.
POINT I
AN INSURER MAY NOT RECOVER OR SUBROGATE AGAINST
ITS OWN INSURED OR COINSURED UNDER A POLICY
OF INSURANCE
A brief restatement of the facts with respect to the
history of Marveon and YESCO!s relationship is in order.
In 1978, Marveon, through its employees, installed a sign at a
Smith's Food King in South Salt Lake County.
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At that time,

Marveon had in place a policy of liability insurance.
Subsequent to that time, in August of 1981, YESCO purchased
virtually all of the assets and maintenance contracts of
Marveon.

As part of that sale, YESCO took over manufacturing

operations of Marveon as well as most of its maintenance
contracts and most of its assets.

Further, YESCO hired many of

Marveon1s employees to continue the same sort of work they were
doing for Marveon, but from that point forward in the name of
YESCO.

Subsequent to the purchase of Marveon by YESCO, the

sign which was initially installed by Marveon in 1978, and
which was subsequently maintained by YESCO and others, fell and
killed plaintiff's deceased, John Pickhover.

As a result of

the death of Mr. Pickhover, a wrongful death action ensued in
which both Marveon and YESCO, among others, were named as party
defendants.

At the time that YESCO purchased the assets of

Marveon, a Purchase Agreement between Marveon and YESCO was
entered into. As a part of the agreement, YESCO promised to
provide liability insurance for Marveon in an amount of
$1,000,000.

This was never done.

Marveon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for
indemnification pursuant to the purchase agreement and the
trial court granted that Motion.

Ultimately, this Court

sustained the trial court's granting of summary judgment but
remanded for a determination of damages.
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Following the filing

of the Opinion of this Court, Marveon filed a Petition for
Rehearing, essentially claiming that the determination of this
Court with respect to damages was incorrect and perhaps outside
the bounds of its authority.
It is YESCO's position, because of its unique
relationship to Marveon, that neither Marveon, nor its insurer
in some subrogated capacity, may maintain an action against
YESCO.

At the time of trial, the jury determined the

percentages of fault of both Marveon and YESCO.

Marveon,

through its carrier, paid its percentage of fault, and YESCO,
through its carrier, paid its percentage of fault. Now,
Marveon seeks to have this Court order that YESCO pay for
Marveonfs share of the damages.
under the circumstances.
and the same.

This is wholly inappropriate

Marveon and YESCO are essentially one

At the time the accident happened, the

maintenance contract, which was originally sold by Marveon to
Smith's, was owned by YESCO.

Further, YESCO was, in fact,

providing electrical maintenance on the sign.

Also, YESCO's

employees that maintained the sign included former employees of
Marveon, employees that had originally installed the sign.
Marveon and YESCO are indistinguishable for purposes of
subrogation.
The doctrine of subrogation allows an insurer, having
paid a loss resulting from a peril insured against, to step
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into the shoes of its insured and recoup its losses from a
tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss.

Board of

Education of Jordan School Dist. v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246,
1247 (Utah 1977).

However, an insurer may not recover against

its own insured or coinsured under a policy.

Id.

Without

going into needless detail, it is YESCO's opinion that the
insurance that was in place and purchased on behalf of Marveon
prior to the sale of Marveon to YESCO inured to the benefit of
YESCO once Marveon's assets, in particular the maintenance
agreement which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, were
purchased.

In other words, when YESCO purchased Marveon, it

purchased all of its assets including insurance coverages
that would afford coverage for Marveon should Marveon be named
in a suit subsequent to the sale.

The insurance that was in

place for Marveon directly benefited YESCO.

As a consequence,

YESCO is essentially an insured under Marveon's policy.
Therefore, Marveon's carrier cannot maintain an action against
YESCO for a subrogated interest.
Counsel for Marveon has argued vigorously that there
is no evidence with respect to insurance in the record and that
it was brought up in the first instance by counsel for YESCO at
oral argument on YESCOfs appeal from the summary judgment.
However, the Court cannot make a decision with respect to
damages in a vacuum.

The Court has one of two options.
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It can

remand to the trial court to determine what damages were
actually suffered by Marveon, or it can make its decision as a
matter of law under the circumstances.
Court must reflect reality.

The decisions of this

Counsel for Marveon urges a

position that will ignore reality and allow a windfall to be
reaped by Marveon's insurance carrier.

A windfall not

predicated on the risk adduced at the time the policy of
insurance was purchased by Marveon nor contemplated in the
premiums charged.
POINT II
MARVEON SUFFERED NO DAMAGE AS A RESULT
OF YESCO'S FAILURE TO BUY INSURANCE
This Court, in its decision handed down February 10,
1989, remanded to the trial court to determine the
compensable damages suffered by Marveon as a result of
YESCO's breach.

Apparently, this Court cited for the benefit

of the trial court, the case of PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Continental Heller Corp., 603 P.2d 108 (Ariz. App. 1979).

The

method for determining damages set out in PPG Industries,
is inappropriate for this case.

First of all, PPG

Industries involves a contract between a general contractor
and a subcontractor wherein the type of insurance to be
purchased is specified with some particularity.

In fact, the

contract even specifies which insurance shall be primary.
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No

such specific language is apparent in the purchase agreement
between Marveon and YESCO.

Further, it appears that the

opinion of the Court with respect to damages is flawed.

YESCO

urges the Court to review the case of Klonis v. Armstrong,
436 So.2d 213 (Fla. App. 1983).

It is YESCO's position

that the reasoning of the court in Klonis makes much more
sense with respect to determining what damages should be
allowed as a result of the failure to purchase insurance
pursuant to a promise.
In Klonis, an insurance agent failed to purchase
"described articles" insurance for theft.

Naturally, a theft

did occur and insurance that was already in place, and which
specified that it would be excess insurance if other insurance
existed, paid the claim.

Subsequently, the insurance carrier

that paid the claim on behalf of the insured attempted to
subrogate against the insurance agent.

In pertinent part, the

Court stated in response to the insurance company's argument
that it was entitled to subrogation:
However, this argument fails for the same
reason as the previous one — [the insured]
had no right of action against [the
insurance agent] for the . . . insurance
proceeds to which the insurance company
could become equitably subrogated. . . .
[A]s to [the insurance company] [the
agent's] alleged undertaking was entirely
gratuitous, and a legal duty would run to
[the insurance company] only if it had
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relied upon [the insurance agent's]
gratuitous undertaking.
Id. at 216 and 217.
In this case, there is no question that the insurance
company that insured Marveon in 1978, did not rely upon any
promises of YESCO to Marveon to purchase insurance.
be ludicrous to assert.

This would

It was not even contemplated in 1978

that Marveon would sell to YESCO and there is nothing in the
record to indicate that Marveon's insurance company, at the
time of the sale of Marveon to YESCO, relied in any fashion
upon promises made by YESCO to Marveon.

This is particularly

so in light of the fact that premiums were presumably paid in
1978, some three years prior to the sale of Marveon to YESCO.
As stated previously, not one dime was paid by
Marveon, or its carrier for that matter, for the negligence of
YESCO.

Marveon paid, through its insurance carrier, for only

its portion of the fault.
YESCO.

It did not pay for any fault of

Marveon certainly cannot argue that it is entitled to

any damages from YESCO based in tort.

The only possible claim

that Marveon has against YESCO is in contract, i.e., the breach
of the promise of YESCO to purchase insurance on behalf of
Marveon.

Notwithstanding the failure of YESCO to purchase this

insurance, Marveon has suffered no damage.
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POINT III
MARVEON'S INSURANCE CARRIER HAS NO SUBROGATED
INTEREST AGAINST YESCO
As stated previously, the doctrine of subrogation
will allow an insurer, once it has paid a loss which
resulted from a peril insured against, to step into the shoes
of its insured and recoup its losses from a tort-feasor whose
negligence caused the loss.

Board of Education of Jordan

School Dist. v. Hales, supra, at 1247. The critical
issue here is to determine whether or not YESCO is a
tort-feasor whose negligence caused Marveon's loss.

Had

Marveon, or its insurer, paid any money out on behalf of YESCO
for YESCO's fault, it is clear that Marveon would have an
indemnity claim against YESCO.

As a consequence, Marveon's

insurer could step into YESCO1s shoes and subrogate against
YESCO for the amount it paid that was the result of YESCO's
negligence.

However, losses suffered by Marveon in the

underlying lawsuit of this case were the result of Marveon's
negligence, not YESCO1s. Marveon did not have a judgment
assessed against it because YESCO failed to purchase insurance
with Marveon as a named insured.

Marveon had a judgment

entered against it because of its negligence in installing the
sign.

The only claim that Marveon has against YESCO is one for

breach of contract.

In considering Marveon and YESCO together,
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it is apparent that as between the two of them, Marveon has
suffered no loss because of YESCO1s failure to purchase
insurance.

Likewise, at the time that YESCO purchased Marveon,

there was no privity of contract between Marveon1s insurance
carrier and YESCO.

Further, there is no evidence in the record

whatsoever that Marveon1s insurance company expected a benefit
from the sale of Marveon to YESCO or detrimentally relied upon
the sale of Marveon to YESCO.

As a consequence, the amount of

money that Marveon•s insurance company would not have paid if
YESCO would have purchased insurance cannot be a measure of
damages.

It is wholly irrelevant to the consideration of the

damages suffered by Marveon.

Further, it will result in a

complete windfall for Marveonfs insurer if YESCO should be
obligated to pay to Marveon's insurance company the amount of
money that Marveon's insurance company paid out on behalf of
Marveon for Marveon1s negligence, not YESCO1s.
Besides, as set out above, Marveon's insurer has no
subrogated interest.

The right to subrogation for Marveonfs

insurer could only arise because it paid losses for a
tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss.

In this case,

the tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss was Marveon.
YESCOfs negligence did not cause Marveonfs loss.

YESCOfs

failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon did not
cause Marveon1s loss.

Marveon caused Marveon's loss.
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Nonetheless, as between Marveon and YESCO, Marveon suffered no
loss.
There is no rational basis why Marveon's insurer
should be paid any money.

Marveon's insurance carrier was not

a party to the contract between Marveon and YESCO, it was not a
third-party beneficiary of the contract between Marveon and
YESCO, nor did it detrimentally rely on the contract between
Marveon and YESCO.

There is no basis in tort law, contract

law, or equity by which Marveon or Marveonfs insurance carrier
should be able to recover any money from YESCO.
The case of New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Ballard
Wade, Inc., 404 P.2d 674 (Utah 1965) is compelling in this
regard.

In that case, a fire insurer, together with its

insured lessor, repaired damage to an insured building caused
by fire of undetermined origin.

The lease agreement between

the lessor and the lessee provided that the lessee would secure
the lessor for loss by fire and would also return the premises
at the end of the term in as good as condition as when they
were received.

Following repair by the insurer and the lessor,

the insurer attempted to subrogate against the lessee for the
costs of the repairs.

The Supreme Court agreed with the trial

court that pursuant to the lease terms, the lessee was
absolutely liable to the lessor for any loss.

However, the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah determined that the insurer
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could not recover from the lessee because, (1) the lessee
promised only to pay a loss to the lessor, who in that case
lost nothing after insuring himself; (2) there was nothing in
the lease that hinted that the insurance company was a
third-party beneficiary; (3) the insurance company could hardly
claim indemnity from another party who had made a written
guarantee against loss, to which agreement the insurance
company was neither a party nor expressly or impliedly a
beneficiary; and (4) the lessee was not shown to be negligent.
Id. at 675. This case clearly represents the position of the
Utah Supreme Court that windfall recoveries by insurance
companies against other indemnitors will not be favored.
Again, YESCO anticipates that counsel for Marveon
will argue that statements with respect to insurance are
outside of the record.

This is a nearsighted view.

There is

no other purpose why Marveon would wish to recover money from
YESCO other than for it to go directly to its insurance
carrier.

Marveon can only recover for damages actually

incurred.

There is no question that it did not incur any

damages as a result of YESCO's failure to purchase
insurance.

As a consequence, the insurance question must be

considered by this Court if its decision is to make any sense
in light of all of the circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
YESCO urges this Court to rehear the arguments of
both counsel for Marveon and counsel for YESCO on the issue
of damages. Although YESCO does not concede that it breached
its contract with Marveon by failing to purchase insurance on
behalf of Marveon, YESCO argues vigorously that the measure of
damages, as set out by the Court and by counsel for Marveon,
are inappropriate under the circumstances.

YESCO purchased

Marveon1s assets and contracts and, for all intents and
purposes, was the beneficiary of Marveon1s insurance policy.
As a consequence, Marveon's insurance carrier cannot subrogate
against YESCO because it is essentially its insured.
no real damage was suffered by Marveon.

Further,

Certainly there were

no tort damages that Marveon suffered as a result of YESCO's
actions.

There may have been a breach of contract by YESCO for

its failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon, but
that breach produced no actual damages to Marveon.

If

Mr. Henderson's point is taken that insurance ought to be
removed from all consideration by this Court, then YESCO1s
position is even stronger.

No damages, in that event, can

possibly be seen to have been suffered by Marveon as a result
of the accident, and Marveon should not be entitled to recover
any money for YESCO!s failure to purchase insurance,
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particularly since no money was expended by Marveon as a result
of that failure.
Marveon1s insurance carrier simply has no subrogated
interest against YESCO.

Marveonfs insurance carrier's

subrogated interest against YESCO, if any, would necessarily
need to be founded in tort.

No dollars have ever been paid out

by Marveon1s carrier as a result of YESCO's tortious conduct
against others.
interest.

Therefore, Marveon's carrier has no subrogated

YESCO!s breach of contract, if any, is not the

sort of interest to which Marveonfs carrier has a right of
subrogation.
YESCO urges this Court to rehear the matter and to
determine that Marveon has suffered no damages as a result of
YESCO's failure to purchase insurance pursuant to the
Purchase Agreement, or in the alternative, to remand the matter
to the district court for a determination of damages consistent
with YESCO1s position.
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